Hamas (Gaza Strip)

Prior to October 7, Hamas operated a well-armed, entrenched military infrastructure in Gaza, stockpiling over 30,000 rockets and maintaining command over a full terror-state apparatus. It enjoyed impunity, periodic Qatari funding, and limited to no deterrence from Israel. Since the outset of the war, Hamas has lost control over most of the Gaza Strip, suffered crippling leadership and operational losses, and is facing ongoing IDF pressure, mostly in northern and southern Gaza. While not eliminated, Hamas’s military capacity and governing capabilities have been drastically degraded, and will have a hard time carrying out any significant military operations against the State of Israel so long as the IDF’s presence remains in Gaza and archives its objectives.

Hezbollah (Lebanon)

Prior to the war, Hezbollah represented Israel’s most powerful conventional threat, with over 150,000 rockets and a strong foothold near the northern border. Since October 7, Hezbollah has opened a northern front against Israel as a sign of sympathy with Hamas. It started engaging in daily clashes with Israel, but over 154 of its senior and mid-level commanders have been eliminated, and Israel has destroyed an estimated 80% of its rocket stockpiles. The new ceasefire grants Israel with a large degree of liberty to attack targets inside Lebanon freely and undeterred. Hezbollah is also facing growing political pressure within Lebanon, where opposition to its reckless military provocations has weakened its domestic standing, further eroding its regional influence and its capability to restore its force buildup.

Syria

Prior to October 7, Syria functioned as a vital corridor for Iranian weapons transfers and a base for IRGC and Hezbollah operatives. Since the war, however, the Assad regime has collapsed under internal and external pressures, ending Iran’s strategic foothold in the country. Although Israel did not instigate this development, and would rather deal with the stable Assad regime, its peripherial activity to erode Hezbollah’s capacities, Assad’s military toolbox and Iran’s presence in the country significantly contributed to the conditions that allowed it.

This collapse has severed critical supply routes from Iran to Hezbollah, significantly disrupting Iran’s regional logistics network and degrading Hezbollah’s future capacity to rearm. Turkey's ambitions in Syria are a threat for the next chapter in Israel's security concerns, but not for the near to mid future.

Iran

Iran remains the greatest strategic threat on Israel, the region, and the world, especially due to its rapidly advancing nuclear program. Its pre-war strategy relied on regional proxies to pressure Israel without direct confrontation. Since October 7, Iran's coordination with its proxies has drawn it closer to confrontation which included a direct attack from Iran on Israel, twice, which resulted in little damage, but also revealed its limits in proxy effectiveness and regional support. The targeted killings of IRGC commanders in Damascus and Tehran’s cautious responses suggest heightened Israeli deterrence, though the nuclear threat persists. This threat could change as a result of a nuclear deal with the USA, or a joint Israeli-USA military operation targeting Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Palestinian Authority and Statehood Push

In the first year of the war, immense international pressure brought back the notion of a Palestinian State into the discourse, however within Israel the appetite for any sort of compromise with the Palestinians almost completely disappeared. Since the fourth quarter of 2024 until today, enthusiasm for Palestinian statehood has waned amid concerns over Palestinian support for terror and the risks of creating a state that could fall under Hamas or similar factions. Israeli security arguments against a rushed two-state solution have gained renewed legitimacy and a Palestinian State seems farther away and less likely now than prior to the war.

Conclusion

While the Iranian nuclear program remains a pressing concern, Israel’s broader security environment has undergone a significant transformation. Key threats have been weakened, adversaries are more cautious, and Israel has regained the strategic initiative. The perception that Israel is in a worse position today overlooks these fundamental shifts. Moreover, the threat of arms embargoes and mounting international pressure is beginning to ease, while Israel’s position in the Middle East—and among its global allies—has strengthened as it demonstrates both resilience and military capability.